The Corn Supply of the Roman Armies During the Third and Second Centuries B.C. by Erdkamp, P.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
THE CORN SUPPLY OF THE ROMAN ARMIES 
DURING THE THIRD AND SECOND CENTURIES B.C.1
Introduction
A major role in the corn supply of the Roman armies, from at least the third
century B.C. on, is ascribed to large scale contractors, who took care of all
aspects of organization, administration and execution. In Badian’s influential
study of these private entrepreneurs, it is supposed that the feeding of the
Roman armies exceeded the capabilities of the Roman governmental apparatus;
as a result, the state in Republican times had to rely on private enterprise.2 The
role given to private entrepreneurs assumes that private trade was capable of
supplying and distributing huge amounts of corn without much difficulty. On
the other hand, the capabilities of the Roman governmental structure seem very
limited. The question whether indeed it was private business and not the Roman
state itself that managed the corn supply of the Roman armies is important for
our understanding of the Roman wars, the state and private trade in this period.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that the evidence furnished for the
role of large scale contractors in the corn supply of the armies is inadequate.
The sources provide ample evidence of other means the Roman government had 
to acquire corn for its armies.
1 1 wish to express my gratitude to professors J.S. Richardson, E. Badian and GT Rickman 
and dr. G. de Kleijn for their stimulating criticism of an earlier draft of this paper. The 
paper was partly written during a visit to the University of Edinburgh, which was made 
possible by a grant from the Reiman-De Bas Fonds, Netherlands,
2 E. Badian, Publicans and sinners. Private enterprise in the service o f  the Roman republic, 
Oxford 1972, 16ff. This emphasis on the role of private business, caused by the rudimen­
tary governmental structure, is, according to G. Rickman, The c o m  supply o f  ancient 
Rom ey Oxford 1980,26,34, an important point in connection with the civilian corn supply 
as well. Badian seems to be regarded as decisive since. See e.g, P.A. Brunt, ‘Die Equites 
in der spaten Republik’, übers, u. erw. v. 'The equites in the late Republic’, 1962, in: H, 
Schneider (Hrsg.), Zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftgeschichte der späten römischen Republik, 
Darmstadt 1976, 175-213, 210; E.S. Gruen, ‘Material rewards and the drive for empire’, 
in; W.V. Harris (ed.), The imperialism of  mid-republican Rome, Papers and monographs 
o f  the American Academy in Rome, vol. 29, Rome 1984, 65. The point had also been 
made by G . Ürögdi, ‘Publicani’, RE Suppl. 11, 1968, 1188.
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Publicani
The supposed structural role of large scale contractors in the food supply to the 
Roman armies is based largely on a rather dubious story which involves 
publicani in the provisioning of the Spanish army during the Hannibalic War 
(Livy 23.48f. and 25.3ff.).
In the year 215 the commanders of the army in Spain informed the senate of 
their accomplishments, but also of the shortage of money, clothing and corn. 
They would try to get money themselves, but clothing and corn had to be 
delivered from Italy. The senate agreed that these demands were justified, but 
lacking the necessary resources they decided to appeal to those who had made 
profits before from state-contracts to deliver the necessary supplies to the 
Spanish army on credit. On the day fixed by the praetor, nineteen individuals in 
three societates were willing to subscribe to the contracts on two conditions. 
Firstly they demanded exemption from military service for the duration of the 
contracts and secondly they demanded that the state should carry all the risk of 
adverse weather conditions or hostile actions (23.48ff.).
Some years later one of these publicani -  M. Postumius from Pyrgi -  was 
charged with fraud. Together with a colleague -  T. Pomponius from Veii -  he 
had deliberately sunk worthless ships or pocketed money for non-existant ships 
and cargoes. The accusations and the ensuing trial led to a political row. At first 
the senate was reluctant to take action, because it was afraid of offending the 
class of public contractors. When two of the tribunes started prosecution 
nonetheless, the publicani at first tried to obstruct their action using the veto of 
one of their colleagues; later they resorted to simple violence. As a result, the 
senate took a firm line with the publicani (25.3ff.).
Badian concluded from the story that “the selling of such contracts was the 
only known way of getting supplies, and that it had been systematized into set 
forms.”3 Even if we take Livy’s account at face value, the story seems to 
support this conclusion only imperfectly. It is impossible to tell on the basis of 
the story if entrepreneurs were regularly and normally involved in the acquisiti­
on of corn. Even more audacious is the conclusion that the Roman government 
only had recourse to large scale contractors for its corn supply of the armies. 
Tenney Frank, for instance, suggested that it was only during the Second Punic 
War that the help of publicani was called upon for the provisioning of the army 
and that Rome reverted to governmental control during the wars in the East 
because of the fraud this led to.
Even on the basis of the story as it is told by Livy it is hard to come to any 
conclusion. But to what extent is the account of Livy in this instance to be 
trusted? There are various reasons to assume this story is rather dubious. The
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3 Badian (op. cit. n. 2) 17.
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most serious criticism is that the story contains many anachronistic elements. 
Badian rightly rejected the depiction of the political row which implies “an 
organized ordo publicanorum with the sort of status and powers it had in the 
age o f Cicero”. He points also to certain inconsistencies in the attitude of the 
senate. The planned obstruction of the action of two of the tribunes by the veto 
of a third, together with the use of open violence in a public assembly, seem no 
less anachronistic and find an obvious parallel in the late second century B.G 
The criticism in the first instance undermines only the credibility of the 
latter part of the story. 23.48ff. and 25.3ff., however, are clearly part of the 
same tradition, and we have to conclude that this information comes from a not 
reliable one. Though Livy may be the only source we have for the internal 
affairs of Rome in this period, we must admit that he often is not trustworthy. In 
the Livian tradition “the actual history was written in the late Republic, often in 
the light of contemporary events*”4
Even if we would assume the famous “kernel of truth” in the story, the 
whole construction would depend on the mention of corn among the cargo. As 
we shall see later, contracting was one of the means used by the Roman 
government to acquire uniforms, horses etcetera for their armies. Some igno­
rant later Roman writer could easily have made the mistake to add corn. This 
possibility is not proposed as a likelihood, but to emphasize the danger in 
depending on such slight grounds in the face of much better evidence.
In a later instance, however, Livy was thought to have provided corrobora­
tion of the theory, when he mentions Cato's measures regarding the food supply 
of his army in Spain in 195 B.C. The relevant passage in Livy (34.9,12) says: Id 
erat forte  tempus anni, ut frumentum in areis Hispani haberent; itaque red- 
emptoribus vetitis frumentum parare ac Romam dismissis 'bellum* inquit *se 
ipsum a le t \  Some scholars see this as the dismissal of the publicani, who had 
contracted for the provisionment of food to the Spanish army.5 The text,
4 Badian (op. cit. n. 2) 18f. Cf. p. 15; “No Roman history was written before about 200 B.C. 
The details of earlier history were often freely invented by later writers in the light of 
contemporary interests and conditions." Compare the uncritical attitude towards the 
Livian account by T. Frank, ‘Rome and Italy of the Republic1, in: T. Fank (ed.), An 
econom ic survey o f  ancient Rome, vol. I, 1933, Paterson 1959, 86, 149; A, Toynbee, 
H annibal's  legacy. The Hannibalic War's effects on Roman life, vol. II, London 1965» 
352ff.; T. Pekdry, Die Wirtschaft der griechisch-römischen Antike, Wiesbaden 1976, 
82f.; Rickman (op. cit. n. 2) 33f.; J.S. Richardson, Hispaniae. Spain and the development 
o f  Roman imperialism 218-82 B.C., Cambridge 1986,42f.; J. Briscoe, ‘The Second Punic 
War1, CAH  2nd ed., vol. VIII, Cambridge 1989,75; J. Seibert, Hannibal, Darmstadt 1993, 
2 8 7 ff. The reference to T. Pomponius also arouses suspicion. The elaborate story of his 
defeat as praefectus sociorum in 25.1 ,3ff. seems to be a doublet of events which had taken 
place before. See D.-A. Kukofka, Süditalien im Zweiten Punischen Kriege Frankfurt am 
Main, 1990, 3 Iff.
5 J,A, Briscoe, A commentary on Livy, books XXIV-XXVII, London 1981,70, even refers to
however, does not allow only this interpretation, for redemptor may just as well 
have the meaning of ‘supplier’ or ‘entrepreneur’ in general or of ‘transport 
contractor’.6 Parare does not only mean ‘buy*, but also ‘furnish’, ‘equip’, 
‘deliver" and ‘supply’. Other possible translations are “Cato forbade the trans­
port contractors to deliver the grain and sent them back to Rome”, or “Cato 
forbade the tradesmen to furnish the grain and sent them back to Rome”. This 
passage is therefore open to various interpretations.
Furthermore, Polybius in his discussion of the publicani in book 6 does not 
mention contracts for the food supply of the armies. In 6.17 he even illustrates 
the great importance of these societates with examples of contracts in several 
domains, but army supplies are not one of them. If the contracts for the 
provisioning of the armies had included the food supply and not only uniforms, 
horses etc., this would have been one of the most profitable fields. As I do not 
doubt there were contracts for the provision of uniforms, weapons, horses etc. 
and as these are not mentioned by Polybius either, his silence is not conclusive. 
However, the omission is more easily understood if the food supply, which 
would have been a huge assignment, formed no part of the contracts on behalf 
of the armies.
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Purchases, contributions and levies
In this next section an overview will be given of the means the Romans had 
recourse to for the procurement of military provisions. The accounts of Roman 
warfare in the third and second century B.C. offer ample evidence for the 
military corn supply. I first want to emphasize Roman levies, tributes and allied 
contributions, which were to a large degree determined by the needs of the 
moment. The Roman government did not use only one mechanism to acquire 
corn. There were many alternatives and one did not exclude another. In the next 
paragraph we will assess the part played by the tithes in supplying the army. By 
then it will be time for a more detailed discussion to answer the question
Cato’s conflicts with publicani during his censorship. Cf. Badian (op. cit. n. 2) 28; Brunt 
(art. cit. n. 2) 210; J.S. Richardson, ‘The Spanish mines and the development of provin­
cial taxation in the second century B.C.’, Journal of Roman Studies 66 (1976) 150f.; 
Richardson (op. cit. n. 4) 93.
6 R edem ptor  as such has a wide spectrum of meanings. The RE classifies them in three 
categories: first it means anyone who conducts a task against payment -  the conductor 
o p e r is t in which category we have to include the redemptor operum publicorum\ secondly 
the conductor rei , which refers to hiring and leasing; the third category refers to the 
release o f  captives against ransom. This is the meaning of most instances of the word in 
the work o f  Livy, The most interesting parallels in Livy are 23.48,10, where redempturis 
clearly refers to state contracts, and 42.3,11, where redemptores means ‘transport con­
tractors*.
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whether these mechanisms were based on private business or on state control.
For an important part the trade of grain was an aspect of the normal 
diplomatic relations between states, and it is in this context that we have to 
consider the purchases from states like Numidia, Carthage, Syracuse and Epirus.7 
Hardly distinguishable from these purchases are the free contributions by allies 
and befriended states. During the third century B.C. the most famous of these 
allies was King Hiero II of Syracuse, who according to our sources provided 
corn from the First Punic War on. However, the Romans did not rely on his 
contributions structurally during this war; he only helped when the regular 
supply, which was meant to come from Italy, was cut off or collapsed. The 
treaty did not bind Hiero to provide material aid to the Romans. While in our 
sources he once sold corn to Rome during the interbellum, his contributions 
during the first years of the Second Punic War were also voluntary gifts. The 
amount o f  corn that was sent to the legions in Italy must not be overestimated. 
In the year 216 300.000 modii of wheat and 200.000 modii of barley were sent 
to Italy and in the next year another 200.000 modii of wheat and 100.000 modii 
of barley. Compared to the millions of modii of wheat that were necessary for 
the armies in Italy in each of these years, it can not be regarded as anything 
more than a nice gesture.8
Similar are the contributions of Carthage and Numidia during the wars in 
the east in the first half of the second century B.C. Both states had no treatised 
obligation to provide food, but they probably regarded these supplies as a 
means to gain or strengthen relations with Rome. From the Roman point of 
view these shipments were a welcome, and in some years substantial, contribu­
tion, but Rome could hardly rely structurally on foreign aid.9
The largescale help from states like Syracuse, Carthage and Numidia was 
regarded as interesting enough for an explicit mention in our sources. Structur­
ally probably more important, but in the eyes of the ancient authors not as
7 The embassy to Egypt to sollicit a supply of corn during the Hannibalic War in Polybius
9.1 la  is undoubtedly a further instance of corn trade on a diplomatic level.
8 Diodorus Siculus 25.14; Livy 22.37,1,6; 23.38,13. See for the discussion of the source 
material and earlier literature A.M. Eckstein, ‘Unicum subsidium populi Romani. Hiero II 
and R om e, 263 B.C. -  215 B.C.’, Chiron 10(1980) 196.
9 See Appian, Pun, 94. P. Garnsey, Famine and food supply in the Graeco-Roman world. 
Responses to risk and crisis, Cambridge 1988, 185f. rightly stated, “the contributions 
were not part of an organized system for supplying Rome and the armies,” Frank (op. cit, 
n. 4) 160, concludes from the contributions and the strength o f  the armies in these years, 
that “when ten or twelve legions were active, additional supplies had to be bought or 
accepted as gifts from Africa and elsewhere.” According to Livy 36.4,Iff., the kings of 
Macedon and Egypt offered money and corn for the war against Antiochus. This informa­
tion, however, is widely distrusted. See for the discussion Briscoe (op. cit. n. 5) 224f.; 
also H.J, Hillen (Hrsg.), T, Livius, Römische Geschichte, Darmstadt 1991, 515f. African 
contributions: Livy 31,19,2ff.; 32.27,2; 36.4,5ff.; 42.29,8; 43.6,1 Iff.
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interesting, were the regular contributions of the allies in and neighbouring to 
the war zone. The source-material on this subject matter is usually scarce and 
vague*
In a speech by Eumenes of Pergamon in the narrative of Polybius (21.20), 
the Greek ruler reminds the Romans that he had provided the Roman and allied 
armies with provisions during the war against Antiochus. In the parallel speech 
in Livy’s account, Eumenes mentions the contribution of provisions under his 
father Attalus (37.53,9). It cannot be doubted that aid in the form of corn was 
provided by states like Pergamon, which were not only allied to the Romans, 
but directly involved in the war as well. Possibly these states were bound by 
treaty to deliver corn.10 From various instances in the sources we must conclude 
that the small states near the warzone -  like the allied towns in Sicily during the 
First Punic War, the communities in Southern Italy during the Hannibalic War, 
and some towns in Africa during the Third Punic War -  also contributed to the 
needs of the Roman and allied armies.11
Besides acquisition of corn through trade from states like Syracuse, Car­
thage and Numidia, there is also mention of purchases in parts of Italy. During 
the Second Punic War the senate is said to have occasionally bought grain in 
Etruria through legates or a praetor,12 The practice of the acquisition of corn 
through representatives we meet again in the year 172. As part of the prepara­
10 Compare the case of Athens, which in 170, albeit unwillingly, had to comply with the 
Roman demand o f  100.000 modii of corn (Livy 43.6,Iff.).
11 Polybius (1.18) mentions the help of the allies on Sicily during the First Punic War, who 
brought supplies to the Roman supply base at Herbesos. In a similar case, he tells us that 
the supplies for the military stores at Cannae during the Second Punic War were collected 
from the Apulian hinterland surrounding Canusium, which was allied territory (Polybius 
3.107,3), During the Third Punic War various African cities provided the Roman army 
with provisions (Appian, Pun. 94). See also Livy 23.46,9; 34.26,10; 38.41,8; Appian, 
Hann . 34. Livy 22.16,4 states that the Roman army, which in the summer of 217 watched 
the Punic army ravaging the Campanian plain, could count on the contributions of the 
nearby allies. This statement occurs, however, in an unhistoric story. See P. Erdkamp, 
‘Polybius, Livy and the Fabian strategy’, Ancient society 23 (1992) 133. The voluntary 
contributions of the Etruscan states to Scipio’s campaign in Africa (Livy 28 .45 ,14ff.) are 
too unreliable to allow any conclusions. See esp. Frank (op. cit. n. 4) 93f.; Toynbee (op. 
cit. n. 4) 11; A.J. Pfiffig, ‘Die Haltung Etruriens im Zweiten Punischen Krieg’, Historia
15 (1966) 205ff.; P.A. Brunt, Italian manpower, 225 B.C. -  A.D. 14, Oxford 1971, 655f. 
Caesar gives an important insight into the contributions of allies during the Gallic and 
civil wars: Caesar, B.G. 1.16; 1.48,2; 2.5,5; 3.7,2-4; 7.10,1-3; 7.17,2-5; B.C. 1.48; 1.60; 
3.47; 3.58.
12 Livy 25.15,4; 25.20,2; 27.3,9. There is some doubt on the reliability of the first of these 
cases. See most recently Kukofka (op. cit. n. 4) 57ff. This might cast doubt on both other 
instances as well, but in the light of other evidence there is hardly enough reason to reject 
the mechanism as such.
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tions for the war against Macedon, three legates were sent to Apulia and 
Calabria to buy grain for the navy and army (Livy 42.27,8). On the basis of the 
very slight information that is given in our sources, it is impossible to decide 
whether this trade was with private traders or with the town communities. Free 
contributions and government purchases in Italy might have to be seen in the 
same light as the contacts with Syracuse, Carthage, Numidia and Epirus, though 
on a smaller scale. The clearest instance we have in this regard is the inscription 
on the purchase of corn from Thessaly in the late second century B.C., which is 
clearly on a diplomatic level. For the mechanisms involved in this Î have to 
refer, however, to the later discussion.
One of the easiest ways for the Romans to acquire grain for their armies was 
to exact contributions from other states. The distinction between regular aid by 
allied states and ad hoc contributions, which were enforced by the presence of 
the Roman armies, will in some cases have been subtle. The statement of Cicero 
{De imp. Cn. Pomp . 38.15), who doubts that more cities of the enemy were 
ruined by Roman troops than allied cities as a consequence of the quartering of 
troops during winter, leaves no doubt as to the harshness of Roman demands. It 
must be emphasized that Cicero had the chaotic times of the first century B.C. 
in mind, but even in earlier times the Romans probably forced helpless allies to 
provide winterquarters. The scarcity of the source-material does not allow a 
clear view of the usual Roman attitude. Some instances of harsh treatment of 
small states in the eastern world during the first half of the second century B.C. 
may be more the result of the emphasis of some of the Roman authors on the 
detrimental effect of the empire on Roman virtues than a true reflection of usual 
practice involving ruthless requisitions.13
Furthermore, it was also usual practice to exact the delivery of corn from 
defeated states. In most cases this grain was explicitly intended for the armies 
and the amount sometimes stipulated in the period for which provisions for the 
army had to be provided. These contributions were demanded, for instance, 
from Carthage and Antiochus, but the peoples of Spain and Sardinia also had to 
deliver corn after Roman victories.14
Such contributions from allied and suppressed states were ad hoc exact- 
ments, determined by the actual need of the Roman armies in wartime. A 
regular levy in corn only followed after provinces were established in some of
13 See esp. T.J. Luce, Livy. The composition o f  his history, Princeton 1977, 250ff. Notorious 
is the way in which Manlius Vulso blackmailed the states of the interior of Asia Minor 
into the delivery o f  money and corn (Polybius 21.36; Livy 38.13,13; 38,14,5ff.;38il5,8ff,), 
Further instances Polybius 21.6; Livy 37.9,Iff.; 43.4,9; 43 .6 ,Iff.; Cicero, Att. 5.21.
14 Carthage: Polybius 15.18; cf, Livy 30.16,1 Off.; Appian, Pun. 54. Antiochus: Polybius 
21.17; 21.43; 21.45; Livy 38.13,8ff.; 38.37,7ff.; 38,38,13f. Spain: 29.3,5; 40,35,4; cf. 
Appian, Iber. 54. Sardinia: Livy 23.41,7; 41.17,2.
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these w ar zones. This is also the conclusion of Richardson regarding the corn 
levies in Spain during the first decades of Roman involvement. “As might be 
expected in an area continually beset by wars and at a considerable distance 
from Rome itself, the methods of revenue-collecting developed in response to 
the conditions on the spot, rather than being imposed from the centre.” Some­
time before the year 171 B.C., when the system was modified, a regular levy in 
the form of the vicensuma was imposed on the Spanish provinces.15
The tithes from Sicily and Sardinia
Sicily and Sardinia contributed to the needs of the Roman legions stationed 
there before the Second Punic War (e.g. Livy 23.48,7). The paucity of the 
evidence, however, does not permit any conclusions as to the exact nature of 
these contributions. The big difference between the Iberian peninsula and Sicily 
was that the latter had known largescale tribute systems, which had been 
exacted by Carthage and Syracuse, before the Roman annexation. The Romans 
indeed took over the tithe system -  the so-called lex Hieronica -  from Syracuse, 
but the exact date is unknown.16
An important breaking point seems to have been the warfare on the island 
during the Second Punic War and Valerius’ reorganisation of the province in 
the years 210-206 B.C., which according to Livy was intended to make possible 
the full exploitation of Sicilian agrarian resources.17 Whatever the exact nature
15 Richardson (art. cit. n. 5) I47ff, He compared these corn levies to the system of the 
stipendium  during this period. Until 180 money was demanded by the governors accord­
ing to the needs of the Roman army. Comparison can also be made with the indictio, 
which came to be levied as an irregular tax as a result of the increased military demands 
under Trajan.
16 This could have been during the organisation of the province in the year 227, or during the 
reorganisation of the province, which now included Syracuse, after the pacification of the 
island in the year 210, or even later. See esp. Toynbee (op. cit. n. 4) II222; R.T. Pritchard, 
‘Cicero and the lex Hieronica3, Historia 19 (1970) 352f,
17 In Livy 27.5,5, Valerius claims to have straightened affairs on Sicily: in peace and war the 
island is now a most dependable source of the grain supply. In 26.40,15f. and 27.8,18f< 
this is explicitly described as the restoration of the situation of the pre-war years. The 
incidental shipments by Hiero and the contributions to the troops stationed on the island 
before and during the first years of the Second Punic War by no means can be compared 
to the structural importance of the island during the late Republic, which is brought to 
mind by the phrasing of the Livian account. Similarly Brunt (op. cit. n. 11) 274. Cf. 
T oynbee (op. cit, n. 4) 2 1 1; G.P. Verbrugghe [a], The Sicilian economy and the slave 
w a rs , c . 210-70 B.C. Problems and sources, Ann Arbor, Michigan 1971, 8ff.; G.P. 
Verbrugghe [b], ‘Sicily 2 1 0 -7 0  B,C. Livy, Cicero and Diodorus’, Transactions and 
Proceedings of the American Philological Association 103 (1972) 537; Garnsey (op. cit, 
n. 9) 186.
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of the corn levies, it is likely that the enlarged province of Sicily was intended 
from the start to contribute regularly and structurally to the food supply of the 
Roman armies. In the year 205, during his preparations for the campaign in 
Africa, Scipio Africanus requisitioned corn from the towns of Sicily (Livy 
29.1,14). It was probably an ad hoc measure, implemented because of the 
temporary presence of the large army.18 While there were some incidental 
shipments of corn to the Roman armies in Italy in the first years of this decade, 
regular supplies occurred during the campaign of Scipio Africanus in Africa 
and continued without any break during the war against Macedon and later.19
In the year 198 B.C. Sicily and Sardinia supplied corn to the Roman army in 
Greece. Regarding the later wars, there are several references to second tithes, 
which were levied in Sicily and Sardinia largely on behalf of the Roman armies. 
The nature of these second tithes is hardly a matter of debate, as they were 
doubtlessly levied primarily to fulfill the increased need of the Roman armies 
during the wars in the east.20
More interesting, however, is the question as to the destination of the 
regular tithes. Rickman and Garnsey assume that they were used to provide a 
regular supply of corn both to the city of Rome and to the armies. Consequently,
18 Verbrugghe (op, cit. n. 17 [b]) 537, even interpreted it as the levy of a tax on grain, but it 
seems rather a late date to introduce such a tax. V.M, Scramuzza, ‘Roman Sicily1, in: T, 
Frank (ed.)> An economic survey of ancient Rome, vol. Ill, 1937, Paterson 1959, 234 
explains the requisition as an additional quota besides the tithe.
19 The shipment of corn to the garrison of Tarentum in the year 210, which was at the time 
besieged by the Carthaginians, will not have involved a large amount and was even 
captured by the Carthaginians (Livy 26.39). Kukofka (op. cit. n. 4) 95, gives an inter­
esting analysis o f  the passage. More significant will have been the supply of corn to the 
city o f  Rome and to the Roman army near Tarentum in the next year (Livy 27.8,18). 
However, this shipment does not have to point to an increased production in Sicily, but 
was rather connected with the reduction of the army on the island from four to two legions 
in the same year, which will have released some provisions for the armies abroad, There 
is silence in the next years. Interesting is Livy’s remark that Scipio requisitioned the grain 
from the Sicilian towns to spare the grain from Italy (29.1,14). If this information is to be 
taken at face value, it means that there could hardly have been a regular supply o f  Sicilian 
corn to Italy at the same time, because in that case it would have meant carrying owls to 
Athens to transport grain from Italy to Sicily. In any case, a really important role can only 
be made to stick for the campaign in Africa. The overseas supplies came not only from 
Sicily; also Sardinia, Spain and Italy itself are mentioned. Supplies from Sicily: Livy
29.35,1 (comp. Polybius 15.1); 30.24,5f,; Sicily, Sardinia and Italy are mentioned in 
29.36,1—3; from Sardinia, Sicily and Spain in 30.3,2.
20 198: Livy 32.27,2. 191: 36.2 ,12f. 190: 37.2,12. 189: 37.50,9f. 171: 42.31,8. The differ­
ence between the war against Antiochus, when second tithes are levied in the years 191- 
189, and the war against Perseus, when a second tithe is only mentioned for the year 171, 
is probably partly connected with the much larger contribution of Carthage and Numidia 
during the latter war (Livy 36.4,5ff.; 43.6,1 ff.). See on the levying of a second tithe on 
behalf o f the armies Toynbee (op. cit. n. 4) 217; Garnsey (op. cit. n. 9) 194.
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Garnsey assumes the grain supply of Rome to have been in jeopardy during the 
wars against Antiochus and Perseus. Indeed in some years, when a second tithe 
was levied, the senate ordered that part of the tithe corn was to be sent to the city 
of Rome, while in the year 190 it ordered a corn shipment to Rome from Africa. 
There is in fact one more or less explicit indication of a food crisis in the city, 
when grain traders were punished in the year 189 for hoarding grain (Livy 
38.35,5). The fact that part of the additional tithe corn was shipped to Rome -  
Livy does not actually say that it was the urban population which was to be the 
main beneficiary -  seems to be the primary reason to assume that part of the 
regular tithe corn was shipped to Rome as well.21 I would like to propose an 
alternative theory, in which I posit that the tithes of Sicily and Sardinia were 
used (almost) exclusively on behalf of the Roman armies, which were constant­
ly operating or stationed in the western half of the Mediterranean.
In most years, the surplus production of the Sicilian and Sardinian farmers, 
minus the regular tithes, could be brought onto the market and became available 
for the supply of structural markets, one of which was the city of Rome. The 
levy of a second tithe fairly diminished the amount of corn available for the 
market. We must not forget that the tithe was actually one tenth of the total 
harvest.22 Since a large part of the harvest was needed as seed corn and for the 
consumption of the producers themselves, the levy of an additional ten percent 
of the total harvest significantly diminished the amount of grain available for 
the market. Furthermore, the structural suppliers of the city of Rome must have 
been an obvious source of corn, to which the Roman government turned in its 
quest for additional supplies for its armies. The huge contributions by Carthage 
and Numidia are clear instances where the stream of corn to the private corn 
markets was depleted even further. The reduction of the market supply was 
inevitably to lead to an increase in corn prices.
It must be emphasized that these assumptions do not imply that the popula­
tion of Rome was structurally and solely fed from Sicilian and Sardinian corn. 
Neither is it to be assumed that market grain played a structural role in the 
feeding of large sections of the civilian population of Italy as a whole. Quite the 
opposite: the effect of the army supply will have been all the larger because the 
part of the population that was dependent on the market for its food supply was 
relatively small. On the other hand, Rome probably relied to a large degree on 
Italian agricultural production for its food supply; otherwise, the withdrawal of
21 Rickman (op. cit. n. 2) 44; Garnsey (op. cit. n. 9) 193f. Hillen (op. cit. n. 9) 514, in his 
note to 36.2,12 states that the tithe corn of Sicily and Sardinia was normally used for the 
troops stationed there. This cannot be the case, for since the end of the Second Punic War 
hardly any troops normally were stationed there. (See esp. Toynbee [op. cit. n. 4] 652.)
22 See Scramuzza (op. cit. n. 18) 237; Pritchard (op. cit. n. 16) 354.
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Sicilian and Sardinian corn would not merely have resulted in price fluctua­
tions, but in a disaster.23
To soften the effect on the population of Rome, and to protect itself against 
widespread discontent, the government in some of these years of increased 
military effort ensured the supply of corn to Rome by sending part of the double 
tithe com. This can be compared to the several instances where corn was 
distributed to the population of Rome in the decades around the year 200 B.C. 
or the time when a shipment was sent from Thessaly in the late second century
B.C. These distributions must be regarded as ad hoc measures of individual 
magistrates or as the release of surplus com in particular circumstances. The 
shipment from Thessaly amounted to about half a million modii, which is only a 
fraction of the total, annual consumption of the population of Rome at the time. 
However, at the right time of year even a small supply could mean a material 
difference to the corn market of the city.24 Likewise, in years of increased army 
demands, some supply of cheap corn to the Roman market could have been 
ensured. The supply to the other structural markets of Sicilian and Sardinian 
surplus grain was nevertheless diminished by the levying of additional tithes. 
This, however, will have been of no concern to the Roman politicians.
The most important difference between the two theories is that in the first 
theory the Roman government secured a regular supply of the Roman corn 
market. The tithe, it is assumed, went annually to the city of Rome and the 
armies. The other theory posits that the tithe went solely to the armies. Only in 
some instances did the Roman government take ad hoc measures regarding the 
food supply of Rome. Neither theory, however, can be proved on the basis of 
the available source material.
23 Brunt (op. cit. n. 11), 286, assumes a substantial supply of corn and other food products to 
the city of Rome from its Italian hinterland even in the first century B.C, and in the early 
principate. See also De Neeve, [review of] ‘Rickman, The corn supply of ancient Rome» 
1980’, Mnemosyne IV 38 (1985) 445f. To their material I want to add Appian, B.C. 1.67 
and 1.69, in which passages it is clearly stated that during the siege of Rome by Marius 
and Cinna, the food supply of Rome is cut off not only by blocking the Tiber downstream 
of the city, but above the city as well. In the following events Marius captures the 
neighbouring towns “where grain was stored for the Romans”. Having first blocked the 
supply over sea and river, it is concluded, he now also has taken command of the supplies 
by land. Because of the location of towns like Aricia and Lanuvium, it is improbable that 
overseas corn, that was shipped to Italy on behalf o f the city of Rome, would have been 
stored there, inland and miles from the Tiber. More probable is that this grain, meant for 
Rome, had grown on the fertile soils of central Italy.
24 Livy 26.10,2; 30.26,5f.; 31.4,5; 31.49,8ff.; 33.42,8. See Rickman (op, cit. n. 2) 34ff.; 
P.D.A. Garnsey, T. Gallant and D. Rathbone, ‘Thessaly and the grain supply of Rome 
during the second century B.C.’, Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984) 38; Garnsey (op. 
cit. n. 9) !93f.
Closely adhering to the information given in Livy’s account, we have to 
conclude that the tithe of both islands constituted a relatively small amount 
compared with the total requirement of a city like Rome and, furthermore, it 
cannot have exceeded the requirement of the usual number of legions in the first 
decades of the second century B.C. The double tithes during the war against 
Antiochus provide clarification in this respect. The presence of 2 to 4 legions in 
the east during this war induced the Romans to levy a second tithe on Sicily and 
Sardinia in the years 191-189. Both tithes went largely to the army involved in 
the war; only part of the tithe corn of Sardinia went, in two out of the three 
years, to Rome. There were also large shipments from Carthage and Numidia to 
the armies in the east, as well as contributions from Pergamon and possibly 
other allies. Since this amount of corn, of which the regular tithes of both 
islands constituted only a part, was consumed by the few legions present and 
the fleet, it is extremely likely that the regular tithe did not exceed the food 
requirement of the 8-10 legions and large naval forces which were operating 
annually during the first decades of the second centuries B.C.25
The regular tithes probably contributed to the military food supply since the 
Second Punic War. The legions that were permanently stationed in the western 
half of the Mediterranean required a constant food supply. The armies that were 
operating in Spain, for instance, were almost annually supplied by outside 
sources as well as receiving ad hoc corn levies from the provinces. Although the 
only two references in Livy to the food supply of the Spanish armies actually 
state that no external supplies were necessary, it is clearly implied that this was 
the exception rather than the rule.26
As the war against Antiochus shows, the military food supply in these 
decades will not only have depended on tithe corn. During the war against 
Antiochus the legions in the other warzones will have fallen back partly upon
25 For the strength o f  the Roman army in the war against Antiochus see esp. Brunt (op. cit. n. 
11) 274; 657f. For a survey of the number of legions in the period 200-168 see Toynbee 
(op. cit. n. 4) 652. In the year 191 two tithes were levied on Sicily and transported to 
Greece. A  second tithe was levied on Sardinia and shipped to Rome (Livy 36.2,12f.). It 
must be noticed that the destination of the regular tithe of Sardinia is not mentioned. In 
the next year both tithes o f  Sicily were transported to the army in Aetolia, while part of 
the tithe corn of Sardinia was shipped to Rome, part to Aetolia (Livy 37.2,12). In the year 
189 B.C. one tithe of Sicily was to be transported to Asia, the other to Aetolia; the same 
was ordered for the two tithes of Sardinia (Livy 37.50,9f.). The contribution from 
Carthage and Masinissa in Livy 36.3,1; 36.4,5ff. The amount of wheat promised by 
Carthage on behalf of the army is uncertain. Assuming that the Carthaginians will have 
contributed about as much as their rival in Numidia, the total amounts to 1.000.000 modii 
o f  wheat and 800.000 modii of barley. Pergamon also contributed com (Polybius 21.20; 
37.53,9). See also Brunt (op. cit. n. 11). Because he wrongly assumes the monthly rations 
to be 3 instead of 4 modiiy his estimates have to be corrected to 2.400.000 and 3.600.000.
26 Livy 34 .9 ,12f.; 40.35,4.
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com reserves, partly on the other means available to the Roman government for 
the acquisition of com. During this war only the regular tithe of Sardinia from 
the year 191 B.C. probably was used on behalf of the legions outside of the 
Greek warzone. Livy (36.2,12f.) states explicitly that both tithes of Sicily were 
transported to the army in Greece, while the second tithe of Sardinia was 
shipped to Rome. He does not mention the destiny of the regular Sardinian tithe. 
As it is likely that Livy would also have mentioned the regular tithe of Sardinia, 
if it had been destined for the army in Greece or Rome, we can be sure that it 
was sent to the other armies. It is interesting to note that Livy in this case seems 
to be not interested in the destination of the regular tithe corn, even while he is 
speaking about thithe corn.
State control or private business
The tasks of some magistrates involved them in the corn supply of the army and 
the city. The aediles were primarily concerned with the market distribution of 
corn in Rome. It was probably only later on that some aediles acquired corn to 
be sold at low prices to the population of Rome. The acquisition of corn seems 
to have been of more concern to the quaestores. The military aspect this 
originally will have involved, is illustrated by the fact that provisions in the 
Roman military camp were controlled by the quaestor (Polybius 6.31,l) .27
The senate had considerable authority over corn supplies. It probably gave 
the orders to the legates to acquire grain; it decided to levy a second tithe and 
ordered the shipment of the supplies to the armies.28 In book 6 Polybius depicts
27 See also Polybius 1.52; Sallust, lug. 29.4; Appian, Pun. 116 for the involvement of the 
quaestores in the provisionment of the Roman armies (cf. Livy 25.13,10.). The role of the 
aediles: Livy 26.10,2; 30.26,5f,; 31.4,5; 31.49,8ff.; 33.42,8. Garnsey et al. (art. cit. n. 24) 
38; Garnsey (op. cit. n. 9) 178ff. See for the involvement of the quaestores in the corn 
supply esp. W.V. Harris, ‘The development of the quaestorship, 267-81 B.C.’, Classical 
Quarterly 26 (1976) 97ff., 104. Interesting is also Livy 23.41,6-7, in which passage we  
are told that the commander, after gaining victory in Sardinia, sailed back to Rome. In 
Rome he delivered the money to the quaestores, the corn to the aediles and the captives to 
the praetor Quintus Fulvius. It is amazing that the corn is delivered to Rome, while the 
two legions remain on the island for years on. A little while after this shipment to Rome  
the food supply of the legions indeed turned out to be inadequate (23.48,6-7). It seems 
improbable that the Roman governor would not have realized the drain on Sardinian 
resources, which came from two Roman legions and allied troops. While the neat delivery 
of money, corn and captives makes a rather construed impression, this information seems 
also contradictory to the latter passage.
28 Senatorial power over corn supplies: Polybius 1.52; Livy 27.3,9; 36.2,12-13; 37.50,9-10;  
42.31,8; 43.6,11-13. Orders for the levy of tithes: Livy 31.19,2-4; 36.2,12-13; 3 7 .5 0 ,9 -  
10; 42.31,8. In 169 Rhodes asks permission of the senate for the import of corn from
the commanding consul as totally dependent on the senate for the provi- 
sionment of the armies. “The consul, when he sets out with his army, equipped 
with the powers I have mentioned, appears to hold absolute authority for the 
execution of his purpose, but in practice he needs the support both of the people 
and of the senate and cannot bring his operations to a successful conclusion 
without them. It is obvious, for example, that the legions require a constant flow 
of supplies, but without the approval of the senate neither corn nor clothing nor 
pay can be provided, so that a commander’s plans can be completely frustrated 
if the senate chooses to be antipathetic or obstructive.”
This dependency of the consul on the senate is rather overemphasized to 
illustrate Polybius’ point pertaining to the equal balance of power in the Roman 
constitution. Because the lines of communication between the commanding 
magistrates and the senate since the First Punic War had become too long for a 
centrally regulated provisionment, the generals had to have some authority for 
the procurement of corn.29
Tenney Frank suggested that as a result of the fraud during the Hannibalic 
War, the state purchased its supplies through its own magistrates during the 
Eastern Wars, Unfortunately he only refers to the second tithes, which were 
levied in Sicily and Sardinia. Frank’s suggestion provoked Badian to remark 
sarcastically: “He does not give us any idea of how the magistrates suddenly 
acquired the technique and the organization that enabled them to manage the 
complicated business of buying supplies and providing transport. Did the state 
itself now go into the contracting business?”30 Based on the argument that the
Sicily  (Polybius 28.2). Interesting is also Ciccro, Att. 6.3: “A great war is likely in Syria, 
which will apparently break forth into this district [Cilicia]» where there is no protection 
and only the ordinary supplies have been voted for the year/’
29 J.P. Adams, Logistics o f  the Roman imperial army. Major campaigns on the eastern front 
in the first three centuries A.D., s,l. 1976,217f., remarks regarding the provisioning of the 
Roman armies that “the Roman military establishment was remarkably slow to develop 
any sort o f superstructure of administrative machinery to meet these various needs. [...] 
T he usual governor with imperium was left to his own devices in seeing to the require­
ments of his forces, And this is what one would expect in any case» for the senate was 
always wary of the independence of a governor who had an army.” It should be noticed, 
however, that a centrally governed provisioning of the armies would on the contrary 
restrict the freedom o f  action of the commanding magistrates, which is indeed Polybius’ 
point.
30 Frank (op. cit. n. 4) 149. He fails to point, however, to evidence for this thesis, Toynbee 
(op. cit. n. 4) 356, says that Frank may be right in stating that the supplies were handled by 
the government itself and also in suggesting that a change of policy had been brought 
about by the unhappy experience of the Hannibalic War. He remarks, however, that 
Livy's notices of the tithes do not clear up this point, but points to the transaction with 
Epirus in Livy 4 4 .16,2f. To which more later. Badian (op. cit. n. 2) 27f. Brunt (art. cit. n, 
2) 210, agrees with Badian, saying in his German addition “man kann sich nicht sehr gut 
vorsteilen, welches andere System außer der Requirierung überhaupt anwendbar war.”
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governmental apparatus of the Roman Republic was totally inadequate, one 
could indeed argue that the state was hardly involved at all in managing the corn 
supply, that its magistrates, legates and commanders only expressed the need 
for corn, and that the actual job was done through private trade and private 
entrepreneurs. Would it make a difference, then, whether these entrepreneurs 
were publicani in the sense of large scale contractors or not?
Against this line of reasoning, two objections have to be made. In the first 
place, the Roman Republic did not have to rely on the mechanisms of private 
business to the degree which is usually assumed. Secondly, there are significant 
differences between different forms of participation of private enterprise; it 
therefore does matter in what way entrepreneurs participated in the execution of 
governmental tasks.
Regarding the first objection, it should be emphasized that trade contrib­
uted less to the military corn supply than provincial tributes, levies and allied 
contributions* As we mentioned briefly earlier, army commanders, legates and 
magistrates were involved in trading of corn at least from the Second Punic War 
on. While we never come across any role of large scale contractors -  or 
publicani in whatever form -  in the corn supply of the Roman armies during the 
late Republic, there are several instances of the direct purchase of corn by late 
Republican generals.31 Most cases are concerned with problems that arise from 
the impossibility to acquire com by trade. The ancient historiography mostly 
concerned itself with the corn supply of the armies, when the situation was 
something out of the ordinary, We can infer from these instances that it was not 
irregular practice for commanders to purchase corn themselves.
Even with respect to the acquisition of corn through trade at a high level -  
Locating surplus corn and making transactions with the people that can provide 
it, whether they are community councils, corn merchants or farmers -  it should 
be emphasized that this did not require a huge administrative apparatus and 
could be managed by special legates, non-combatant members of the military 
staff or personal representatives. Examples of these we find in the three legati 
which were sent by the senate to Apulia and Calabria in 172 B.C. to buy corn on 
behalf of the army, and in Octavian’s freedman, whom the triumvir sent during 
the Civil Wars to acquire corn. The assignment of three legates to go to 
Southern Italy would have been needless, if it was usual practice to delegate the 
actual job to contractors.32 The magistrates and their representatives might have 
contacted corn traders and farmers selling surplus locally and on a small scale. 
It is also possible, as we have indicated before, that Rome traded with local 
communities. Their assignment could very well have been made easier by
31 Appian, B.C. 4.108; Caesar, £.G. 1.16,6; Plutarch, Caesar 41,3.
32 Livy 42.27,8; Appian, B.C. 5.78. See also Caesar, B.G. 3.7,3; B. Afr, 21, 36; Strabo, 
Geogr . 3.4,20; Appian, B.C. 3.11.
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existing connections. To assume a strict division between a class of politicians 
and generals and a class of businessmen, which would make it necessary for the 
state to rely on the mediation of the publicani, would lead to wrong conclu­
sions. The wealth of the elite was based on agriculture, which made contact 
with the corn trade almost inevitable. On the other hand, the profits which were 
to be gained in the provisioning of the armies made it interesting enough for 
traders to approach a legate or commander themselves.33
Sallust (lug. 47. If.) informs us that Metellus expected the many Italic 
traders in the Numidian city of Vaga to be of use in supplying his army.34 There 
were evidently no contracts with large scale contractors. What is more, this 
points to an involvement of private traders in the acquisition of corn which was 
less structural and on a lower level than the supposed management by the 
Roman societates?5
Although some corn was purchased on the private market, we can be sure 
that not all corn was bought through the channels of the private corn trade. As 
we have seen, allied states often contributed or sold corn to Rome on behalf of 
its armies. Two cases offer some insight into the actual management of such 
acquisitions: the purchase of corn from Thessaly in the late second century B.C. 
and the levying of the tithe in Sicily.
33 On the business interests of the Roman elite J. D ’ Arms, Commerce and social standing in 
ancient Rome , Cambridge, Mass. 1981. Caesar, B.C. 7.55,5 provides us with an inter­
esting example o f  the role of traders, when he mentions that those who had gathered 
negotiandi causa in the city of Noviodunum, in which Caesar collected his stores, were 
murdered when the city fell into his enemies1 hands. In one of his elaborate stories, Livy 
41, Iff. informs us that when Roman ships on their way to a campaign against the Illyrians 
put into a Histrian harbour, traders immediately gathered and started to sell their wares on 
the beach. These provisions were collected into the Roman camp. The Histrians made use 
of the chaos to attack and capture the camp. The story is typical for what Gelzer called 
late-annalistic “Kleinmalerei” and is doubtlessly not authentic. It is nevertheless an 
interesting passage. Cf. Appian, B.C. 3.26: When Dolabella arrived in the province of 
Asia, its governor Trebonius, who was a follower of Cassius and Brutus, “would not 
admit him to Pergamon or Smyrna, but allowed him, as consul, an opportunity of buying 
provisions outside the walls.”
34 On the economic and social character of these negotia tors , D ’Arms (op. cit. n, 33) 24ff., 
and H.C, Schneider, ‘Italische negotiatores in Numidien\ in: HJ. Drexhage und J. 
Siinskes (Hrsg.), Migratio et commutatio. Studien zur alten Geschichte und deren Nach­
leben , Münster 1989, 218-225.
35 In this light we also have to view the transfer of part of the responsibility for the 
provisionment o f  the army in Gaul to one of the Roman traders in the city of Cenabum 
(Caesar, B.G. 7.3,1). See also A. Labisch, Frumentum commeatusque. Die Nahrungsmit­
telversorgung der Heere Caesars, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 69, Meisen­
heim am Glan 1975, \ 15ff.
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An inscription that was found at Larissa in 1976 records the purchase of 
Thessalian corn because of a dearth in Italy.36 The Roman aediie who made the 
deal is recorded to have approached the council of Thessaly, which decided that 
430.000 kophinoi (or about 485.000 modii) of wheat would be sent and “that the 
allocations among the cities of the aforesaid quantity of grain be made by 
Petraios the strategos with his co-magistrates and the councillors.”
In the acquisition of corn we can always distinguish several levels. In this 
case the aediie constituted the first level; he contacted the Thessalian council at 
the second level. As executives of the council, the strategos and other magis­
trates did some of the organizational work themselves, but delegated most of 
the actual jobs to those at a lower level, the cities and their officials. The 
inscription is silent about the contact between the city officials and the provi­
ders of the corn at the lowest level. Did the city officials use the town granaries? 
Did they buy from corn traders, or from farmers? Did they acquire corn through 
some sort of levy? We do not know. It is clear, however, that at all the higher 
and intermediary levels the governmental mechanisms were adequate for the 
job and that even at the lowest level the participation of the corntrade is only 
one of many possibilities.
The lex Hieronica partly relates to the acquisition of corn at a low level. 
The workings of the lex Hieronica are known for Roman times, but essentially 
reflect the practice of pre-Roman times as well.37 There are a few important 
characteristics to be noted. The monarch or governor made contracts for each 
community separately, stipulating the amount of corn the contractors had to 
deliver. These tax farmers were mostly local, rich Sicilians and sometimes even 
the cities themselves. The contractors for their part negotiated with each indi­
vidual farmer in their district. The management of the tithes by the contractors 
did not involve corn trade. Although the individual tax farmer could be a corn 
trader of some scale, corn trade as such was not involved in the levying of the 
tithe.38
The cities had an important part to play. To provide the state and the tax 
farmers with the necessary information to base their deals on, the city officials 
had to draw up a detailed annual report of the agricultural resources in their
36 See for text and commentary Garnsey et al. (op. cit. n. 24) 36ff.; Garnsey (op, cit. n, 9) 
187,
37 On the workings of the lex Hieronica, Scramuzza (op. cit. n. 18) 237ff.; Pritchard (op. cit. 
n. 16); Rickman (op. cit. n. 2) 37ff.
38 The corn contractors mentioned in the Loeb edition of Cicero, Plane. 64, seem to be an 
invention of the translator. Cicero, referring to his quaestorship in Sicily in the year 75 
B.C., makes a point of his good relations with the negotiatores> mercatores, municipes 
and socii. While I am perfectly satisfied with the translator’s financiers, traders and allies, 
I have to object to his translation of contractors for municipibus. It seems that the 
translator is working from another edition than the one given in the text.
community. The executive capacity of the cities was not only adequate for 
performing this laborious task, but apparently in some cases to actually do the 
job of the tax farmer as well.
Presumably, other states, like Carthage, Numidia or Pergamon, had similar 
mechanisms to collect the tax corn in their territories. The temporary transfer of 
the farming of the tithes of Asia to the Roman publicani in 123 B.C. by C. 
Gracchus’ law does not vitiate my argument, since it was primarily politically 
motivated and does not point to an absence of alternatives or a preference for 
large scale contracting. The publicani in Asia on their part let sub-contracts 
with the communities. Caesar conveyed the levying of the tithe to the local 
communities, which from then on directly payed a sum of money to the Roman 
government.39 Badian indeed states that the activities of the publicani as tax 
farmers before the introduction of the Gracchan law had been rather marginal.40 
The examples of Thessaly and Sicily corroborate my point that the corn supply 
was largely managed through governmental channels and that reliance on 
private elements was small scale and on a low level. As far as the procurement 
of corn was concerned, the dealings between Rome and other states to supply 
the Roman armies could therefore be managed without the involvement of 
private business on any significant level.
Some aspects of its transportation probably did involve private contractors. 
Unlike transportation over sea, transportation over land in the warzone itself 
and to the military supply bases could largely be managed by military personnel 
and resources. An essential unit of every army was its large detachment of 
calones and muliones, accompanied by a large number of muli and, sometimes, 
wagons,41 If occasionally there was a shortage of packanimals, carriages or 
manpower, the military command took its recourse to requisitions from the 
civilian population. In some cases the supplying communities were ordered or 
offered voluntarily to bring the provisions to the army or supply base.42
39 Plutarch, Caesar 48; Cassius Dio 42.6,3; Appian, B.C. 5.4. See Badian (op. cit. n. 2) 
1 16f,; Rickman (op, cit. n. 2) 60. A significant difference with the tithes from Sicily and 
Sardinia was that in the case of Asia the state received money, and not corn. See Rickman 
(op. cit. n. 2) 42ff.
40 Badian (op. cit. n. 2) 23f.
41 The number of muli and muliones is indicated by the stratagem of staging a fake cavalry, 
whether it is historic or not (Frontinus, Strat. 2 .4 ,1,5,6,8; Polyaenus 4.4,3). G. Veith und 
J. Kromayer, Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer, München 1928, 
394, estimates the number to be 1200 to 1500 for a legion of 4000. Labisch (op. cit, n. 35) 
26, assumes a number of 1200 for a Caesarian legion of 5000. See also F. Stolle, Der 
römische Legionär und sein Gepäck (Mulus Marianus). Eine Abhandlung über den 
Mundvorrat, die Gepäcklast und den Tornister des römischen Legionärs und im Anhang 
Erklärung der Apokalypse 6.6, Straß bürg 1914, 63; Adams (op. cit. n, 29) 224.
42 According to the story about Octavian’s arrival in Italy after Caesar’s death, as told by 
Appian (B.C. 3.11), among the multitude that flocked to him were soldiers, “who were
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The resources needed for huge overseas shipments were of a different scale 
however. For this kind of transport the Roman government in some cases 
probably did turn to shipping contractors. As we have seen, the brief note of 
Livy (34.9,12) could possibly refer to transport contractors, but explicit state­
ments about transportation contracts in a military context, other than the du­
bious story about the fraudulent publicani, do not occur in the sources. The 
principal reasons for assuming that contracts were indeed involved in the 
shipment of army provisions are firstly the analogy of the civilian corn supply 
and secondly the improbability that the Roman government possessed an ade­
quate fleet of freighters,
The transportation of Sicily’s tithe corn was let out to contractors. It could 
have been the case that some tithe farmers acted as contractors as well, but I 
agree with Rickman that usually different groups were involved.43 We should 
not assume too readily that ancient entrepreneurs were involved in all branches 
of business, i.e, that tithe farmers were corntraders and shipowners as well, 
Livy’s statement (30.38,5) that the merchants had to hand over their grain to the 
skippers in the year 202 just to cover the shipping costs, because of the 
extremely low com prices at that time, is very revealing in this respect. There is 
no doubt that shipping contractors were in business with private traders as well 
as the state.
This is not to say that the state had no alternatives to contract shipping. As a 
matter of fact, the sources provide information regarding other ways of ship­
ping military provisions, so we should not overemphasize the dependence on 
contracting. Unlike Rome, states like Carthage and Syracuse did possess an 
adequate fleet of freight ships, and it was usual for overseas suppliers to take 
care of transportation to Rome, the armies or “wherever the senate liked.”44 It is 
even explicitly stated in the inscription concerning the transaction with Thessa­
ly that other measures had to be taken “since the Thessalians have no ships”.45 It 
was decided that “Quintus [the aedile] be responsible for contracting it out as 
seems best to him.”46 The costs were to be settled out of the price of the corn, 
i.e. had to be paid by the Thessalians. It should probably be assumed that the
either engaged in conveying supplies and money to the army in Macedonia, or bringing 
other money and tribute from other countries to Brundisium.” Furthermore: Polybius 
1.18; Livy 38.41,8; Caesar, B.C. 1,60; 3.42; Sallust, lug. 46.5. Forced manpower and 
requisitions; Caesar, B. Afr. 9; Sallust, lug. 75.4; Appian, Pun. 114; Plutarch, Ant. 68.4; 
not historical Livy 27.43,11.
43 Rickman (op. cit. n. 2) 41. See Cicero* In Verr. 2.3,172.
44 This phrase Livy 43.6, I lf .;  furthermore Livy 22.37,1; 23.38,13; 31.19,2ff.; 33.42,8; 36.4. 
On a small scale Appian, Hann. 34. See also Pritchard (op. cit. n. 16) 359; Garnsey et al. 
(op. cit. n. 24) 42.
45 See the text in Garnsey et al. (op. cit. n. 24) 36f.
46  Ibidem.
aedile would let out contracts to shipping contractors in Rome. As a contingen­
cy plan, “if Quintus is unable to send out ships”,47 men will be sent by Quintus, 
who will work together with Petraios the strategos and the other magistrates. 
The workings of this plan are not clear at all, but the transportation plan as a 
whole does not suggest state aloofness or structural dependence on transport 
contracting to the degree that is usually assumed.
This case makes a very important point, which cannot be emphasized 
enough: transport contractors could not guarantee sufficient transportation capaci­
ty in every circumstance. An element of uncertainty such as this, however, 
could jeopardize the Roman military campaigns. Therefore, besides letting out 
shipping contracts, the Roman state had every reason to strive for more direct 
control over freighters.
The sources offer little information to help solve the question whether the 
Roman state actually owned a fleet of cargo vessels. It is probable that the 
Roman navy included some transport ships for daily use. Furthermore it probably 
was the most obvious thing to do with the captured freighters, which are 
frequently mentioned in the accounts of Roman warfare, to incorporate them in 
the Roman navy. But a fleet of 800 freighters, the size of the fleet involved in 
the Roman expedition to Sicily in the year 249 B.C., was of a quite different 
scale 48
Military transportation demands often led to large scale requisitions of 
civilian vessels. During the preparations for the invasion of Africa, Scipio, for 
instance, “sent orders round the entire coastline to have all freighters pressed 
into the service and concentrated at Lilybaeum”. Likewise Cato, when he 
brought his army to Spain in the year 195 B.C., “sent a proclamation along the 
coast to collect ships of every kind”, which from the context clearly refers not to 
warships but to transport ships 49
We can conclude that the Roman state not only had recourse to contract 
shipping, but also to requisitioning ships for its large-scale corn shipments and 
probably to contributions of vessels by allied communities as well, insofar as 
suppliers did not take care of shipments themselves. The measures that were 
taken by the senate and commanders in each individual case will have depended 
on the kind of transportation which had to be undertaken and the circumstances 
prevailing at the moment.
47 Ibidem.
48 Polybius 1.52,
49 Livy 29.24,9. Similarly, Octavian used a large fleet of requisitioned vessels during the 
wars against Sext. Pompeius (Appian, B.C. 5.127). On the other hand, during his wars in 
the Dalmatian region he ordered ships to be built to provision his troops along the Save 
(Appian, III. 22). There seems to be a tendency in some translations to translate Greek and 
Latin terms for freighters and cargo vessels by “merchantmen”. Not all freighters need 
have been merchant vessels.
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It is time to return to the point of departure of this discussion. The commis­
sion of the military corn supply to the societates publicanorum, as envisaged by 
Badian, suggests that a few businessmen took care of all aspects of organiza­
tion, administration and execution. While emphasizing the efforts undertaken 
in the wars of expansion since the Hannibalic War, Badian says, “it is important 
to stress that, as far as we can see, the publicani were in charge of the 
commissariat for all these wars, providing the logistics, and the organization 
that enabled the legions to win them.”50 The important part played by large- 
scale contractors was presumed necessary because of the rudimentariness and 
inadequacy of the governmental structure.
The picture that emerges from the sources is quite different. Through its 
representatives in central and community government and in the armies, the 
state took part at all levels in matters concerning the corn supply of the Roman 
armies. On the other hand, involvement of private entrepreneurs was always at 
a low level and fragmented among different groups. Private entrepreneurs, 
involved in the military corn supply, could include corn traders and farmers, 
who sold corn to legati or officers, or tax farmers, who took care of gathering 
tithe corn at community level, or ship owners, who transported corn and other 
provisions by contract. But the military corn supply as a whole was character­
ized by state controlled mechanisms, in which private entrepreneurs only took 
part, but which they never dominated.
This is not to say that the publicani had no role whatsoever in the provi- 
sionment of the armies. The evidence seems sufficient to assume that the 
publicani were involved in the supply of uniforms, weapons, horses etc. How­
ever, there is a material difference between the historical development of this 
kind of provisionment and that of the military corn supply. The legions in early 
Rome were manned by civilian soldiers, who brought their own arms, uniforms 
and horses into battle. The feeding of the troops, however, always had to be the 
responsibility of the commander and consequently of the state.51 As the Roman 
wars grew longer, it became necessary for the state to provide not only food, but 
also uniforms, horses and weapons. The publicani could be used for this sort of
50 Badian (op. cit. n. 2) 27,
51 W.K. Pritchett, The Greek state at war, vol. 1» Berkeley 1974, 32ff., discusses the early 
Greek practice. The soldiers were ordered to bring along food for a few days -  in Athens 
three days was customary. After this term the food supply was the responsibility of the 
commander. Labisch (op. cit. n. 35) 127,13If., points out that the Celtic armies in the war 
against Caesar’s legions carried along supplies which were meant for the whole campaign 
and which were not centrally managed. The unhappy experiences with this system 
induced Vercingetorix to make some changes. According to F.E. Adcock, The Roman art 
of war under the Republic, Martin classical lectures, vol. 8, Cambridge (Mass.) 1940, 
54ff., Rome was first confronted with the complex problem of the food supply of large 
armies during the Samnite Wars.
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provisionment. The armies’ total demand for uniforms and weapons was not as 
huge as the demand for food, and at the same time much more flexible -  to skip 
the supply of new uniforms for a few months was affordable.
But the supply of these things came to be contracted to the publicani in part 
only. It must not be overlooked that Livy provides evidence of other ways 
besides contracting for the provision of uniforms, horses etc. to the overseas 
armies.52 Livy 44.16,4, which is always cited as a contract for the provision of 
togas, tunics and horses to the Roman army in Greece in the year 169 B.C., 
actually only refers to transporting the goods to the armies. Support in Livy’s 
work of the contracting for supplies other than food constitutes of 23.48,5f. and 
27.10,13.53
The economic context
One of the major characteristics of the military corn supply mechanism is the 
direct involvement of the state, which must be put into contrast with the 
supposed detachment of the state. There were good reasons for ancient states to 
stay directly involved in the acquisition of corn.
The size of the harvest fluctuated heavily, primarily as a result of weather 
conditions. State controlled flows of surplus grain were not as vulnerable to 
fluctuations as the distribution through private trade. With respect to fluctua­
tions in the flow of corn, it is important to differentiate between the total harvest 
and surplus corn. Seed corn and the producers’ own consumption constituted a 
large and inelastic part of the ever fluctuating harvest. This means that, rela­
tively speaking, surplus production fluctuated even more. Although this picture
52 In the first years o f  the Second Punic War, Hiero of Syracuse promised food and clothing 
to the Roman troops on the island (21.50,10). At the end of the Second Punic War in 
Spain, Spanish tribes had to contribute to the Romans corn and clothing (29.3,5). The 
p ro p ra e to r  Cn. Octavius is ordered to obtain on behalf of the army in Africa clothing 
from  the praetor  o f Sardinia, to be sent from that province (Livy 29.36,2f.). Livy 32.27,2 
mentions for the year 198 B.C. the delivery from Sicily and Sardinia not only of corn, but 
also  o f  clothing. Clothing was demanded among other things, including corn, from the 
Rom an ally Phocaea (37.9,Iff.; cf. Polybius 21.6). A year before the contract for the 
delivery of horses to the Roman army in Grecce was made, Masinissa contributed 1200 
horses to the same army (43.6,1 Iff.). Cf. Appian, Iber. 55: the vanquished Spanish tribe 
o f  the Intercatii had to give to the Roman commander 10.000 cloaks and a certain number 
o f  cattle. (See also Caesar, B.G, 7.55.) ■
53 Harder evidence of a state contract for the delivery of such goods refers to the 1st century 
B.C .: probably in the sixties of this century, Ventidius Bassus had resorted “to the humble 
calling  o f  a buyer of mules and carriages, which he had contracted with the state to furnish 
to the magistrates who had been allotted provinces” (Gellius, NA. 15.4,3).
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may differ in detail, it holds true for both peasants and market-oriented far­
mers*54
There are several ways to distribute surplus production. The most important 
ways that concern us here involved levies and the market. A levy like the tithe 
on Sicily was a constant part of total production and therefore normally fluctuat­
ed in proportion to the size of the harvest. The proportion of the harvest that was 
brought onto the market fluctuated heavier than the total size, because it was 
determined by the surplus production.
As the demand for grain and other staple foods was very inelastic, the 
fluctuation in the amount of corn that was brought onto the market will have 
translated itself directly into extreme price-fluctuations, It is a well-known 
phenomenon in early modern societies that these are even more extreme than 
the fluctuations of the supply of corn.
It is important to note the difference between the stream of corn which was 
handled by state controlled mechanisms and the stream of corn which was 
distributed through market channels. The ancient economy was not as trade- 
dominated as our modern world and therefore we must not overlook the im­
portance of non-trade channels. Accordingly, we should not overrate the strength 
of the market section of the ancient economy, certainly not in mid-Republican 
times. The market need not have had access to corn to the degree that non- 
market distribution channels had access. Even if we assume that the state 
allowed itself to be subjected to extreme price fluctuations, it is very doubtful 
indeed that private trade could guarantee a sufficient supply to the armies in all 
circumstances.55
Conclusions
There were many ways in which the Roman government managed the corn 
supply of its armies. The needs and circumstances at each particular time and 
place decided the mechanisms that were used. Since the Second Punic War
54 The proportion of the harvest consumed by the producers is the highest and least flexible 
in peasant agriculture. Farmers working for the market use their labour more efficiently, 
and furthermore they use less seasonal labour in harvesting and threshing when the 
harvests are low. Peasants, however, can hardly adjust the number of mouths to feed to 
the amount of corn harvested. Nonetheless, seed yields and labour productivity were low 
for farmers as well.
55 Most interesting in this regard is E.A. Wrigley, ‘Some reflections on corn yields and 
prices in pre-industrial economies’, in: J. Walter and R. Schofield (ed,)> Famine, disease 
and the social order in early modern society, Cambridge studies in population, economy 
and society in past time, 10, Cambridge 1989, 235-278.
Roman armies were a constant presence in the western part of the Mediterrane­
an and during some years in the east as well. This caused a constant, though 
fluctuating, need of grain. Some mechanisms were ad hoc tributes and contribu­
tions; a constant supply of corn came into being with the tithes in the provinces.
For the execution of these mechanisms the magistrates and commanders 
could use legati, personal representatives and the enormous manpower of their 
armies. Of primary importance was also the executive apparatus of the cities 
and local communities. Purchases and free contributions were handled to a 
large degree on a diplomatic level.
Rome did not depend on large-scale contractors. Involvement of traders, 
skippers and tithe contractors was on a low level and on a small scale. In a 
situation of very fluctuating supply of the corn market, mechanisms which were 
dominated by state control and execution could offer more security and stability 
than private trade could.
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